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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether failure to record a Quit-Claim Deed of joint tenant to
appellant prior to death of joint tenant terminated joint tenancy
and

whether

right

of

survivorship

immediately

vested

entire

ownership in surviving joint tenant (appellee) upon death of joint
tenant.

This is an ancillary issue to whether summary judgment and

award of attorneys fees under Rule 11 U.R.Civ.P. was appropriate.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant has eliminated
facts.

Appellee

submits

or improperly

the

following,

characterized

many

all

of

which

are

step-son

of

plaintiff-

uncontroverted.
Defendant-appellant

Mower

is

the

appellee and the son of Nellie D. Crowther who died on August 9,
1991.

(Paragraphs

2 and

3 of Defendant's Answer.

Appendix,

Appellee f s Brief.)
Appellee was married to Nellie D. Crowther at the time of her
death and was a joint tenant with her at the time of her death in
the following described property located in Summit County, Utah, to
wit:
The West 1/2 of Lot #17 and the East 1/2 of
Lot #18, Weberwild Estates, Plat "A,11 a
subdivision.
(Exhibit

ff

B,n Appellee's Complaint.)

On December

16, 1988, W. Paul Wharton, a Salt Lake City

attorney representing Nellie Crowther, sent a letter to Appellant
on behalf of his mother, Nellie Crowther, enclosing a Quit-Claim

Deed to her one-half interest in the subject property, together
with

a Codicil to her Will and Deed to other property.

The

pertinent parts of Mr. Wharton's letter are:
Enclosed are the originals of three documents:
a) a Quit-Claim Deed regarding the house at
2620 Elizabeth Street in Salt Lake City; b) a
Quit-Claim Deed regarding some recreational
property in Summit County; and c) a Codicil to
your Mother's Will.
Keep them in a safe
place.
As you know, your Mother wanted to be sure
that you receive a 1/2 interest in her
property; her intention is to leave the other
1/2 to her step-children.
There are two
possible chain of events — either your Mother
dies before her husband does, or she dies
after he does. If she dies first, you should
promptly, as soon as it is possible, record
the two deeds with the respective County
Recorder. If your step-father dies first, I
would suggest you contact me (after you've
discussed matters with your Mother). We will
need to know whether Dean Crowther did
anything to affect or alter the ownership or
testamentary disposition of his portion of the
property, before we can decide what needs to
be done with the Deeds.
(Appendix B, Appellant's Brief.)
The Quit-Claim Deed from Nellie D. Crowther to appellant Bryan
Mower which was forwarded to him by W. Paul Wharton on December 16,
1988, was not recorded until August 15, 1991, two and one-half
years later, and six days after the death of Nellie Crowther.
(Appendix C, Appellant's Brief.)
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At the hearing on the summary judgment on March 8, 1993, Judge
Young explained the effect of failure to record a deed to which
appellant replied:
Well, that's taking a risk.
There's no
question about it. There is a risk involved.
And I knew that risk when I took the deeds.
One thing I was . . . .
(Underscoring ours; Page 3, Partial Transcript.)
Appellant's Answer alleges the Deed to appellant was not
recorded until Mrs. Crowther's death, "in
and fear

Mr.

Crowther

would

take

action

order

against

to avoid
her.11

ridicule
(Paragraph

9, Appellant's Answer; Appendix Appellee's Brief.)
STATEMENT OF CASE
Action was filed to quiet title alleging equivocable delivery
of a Quit-Claim Deed by Nellie's attorney to appellant and that the
failure to record the same prior to her death failed to terminate
the joint tenancy.
Nellie her

Appellee's position is that upon the death of

interest

in the property

immediately vested

in the

appellee, the surviving joint tenant.
Appellee contended the appellant's "pro se" Answer and defense
was knowingly not well-grounded in fact or warranted by existing
law and lacks good faith thereby justifying an award of reasonable
attorney's fees in favor of appellee.

On April 14, 1993, appellee

was awarded Summary Judgment quieting title to the property and
attorney's fees.

After the hearing on the motions for Summary

4

Judgment on March 8, 1993, and prior to the filing of the Notice of
Appeal herein, appellant filed a number of ill-founded and spurious
documents

in

the

district

court,

including

a

Motion

for

Reconsideration, Objection to Plaintiff's Version of Court Order
and Motion to Reconsider Attorney's Fees.

All of these documents

are largely unintelligible and contain erroneous legal half-truths,
none of which are well grounded in fact or warranted by existing
law.

Appellee claims additional attorney's fees should be awarded

by this Court pursuant to Rule 11, U.R.Civ.P., and Rule 40(a)
U.R.App.P.
ARGUMENTS
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE
AS THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY
MATERIAL FACT AND APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
This issue is so intertwined with the issue as to the effect
of failure to record Nellie's Quit-Claim Deed to appellant that it
is deemed advisable to combine the argument of both issues.
It is fundamental that summary judgment should be granted
where there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . .
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
(Rule 56C, U.R.Civ.P.)
The primary purpose of the summary judgment procedure is, of
course, to avoid unnecessary trial by allowing a party to pierce
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the allegations of the pleadings and determine whether there is a
genuine issue of material fact.
In the instant case, all the basic documents determinative of
the rights of the parties were admitted and received by the trial
court.

The controlling, undisputed facts in this case revolve

around the letter of W. Paul Wharton, dated December 16, 1988,
which by its terms confirms that the Quit-Claim Deed to defendant
was not to be recorded until after Nellie's death.

Under the terms

of the letter, if Mr. Crowther died first, appellant was to contact
Mr. Wharton (after he discussed matters with his mother).

Thus,

Nellie intended to review the situation, and retained the right to
reclaim or recall the Deeds.

In fact, the letter provides, "We

will need to know whether Dean Crowther did anything to affect or
alter the ownership or testamentary disposition of his portion of
the property, before we can decide what needs to be done with the
deeds."

(Appendix B, Appellant's Brief.)

The joint tenancy was not severed until the death of Mrs.
Crowther since the Quit-Claim Deed was not recorded until some days
after her death.

Title to the entire joint property upon her death

instantaneously vested solely in appellee/plaintiff.
It is elemental that the Quit-Claim Deed could have been valid
as against appellee only if it had been recorded prior to Nellie's
death.
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Survivorship dictates that upon the death of
one joint tenant, his interest in the property
immediately vests in the remaining joint
tenant(s) and does not pass through the
decedent's estate. Thus a joint tenant cannot
devise his interest in land by will or have
his interest descend to his heirs under laws
regulating intestate succession.

Moynihan,

C,

Introduction

to the Law of Real Property,

210 (1988) .

Mr. Wharton's letter clearly instructed Bryan to record the
Deed only if Mrs. Crowther died before Mr. Crowther, otherwise he
was directed to discuss the matter with his mother and to call Mr.
Wharton if Mr. Crowther predeceased Mrs. Crowther.
Thus, the letter is controlling evidence of her uncontroverted
intent,

i.e.,

that

if Mr.

Crowther

died

first

Mrs.

Crowther

intended to review this situation and thus retained the right to
claim or recall the Deeds. Further, the evidence is uncontroverted
that Nellie's intent was not to record the Deed until after her
death "in order to avoid ridicule and fear Mr. Crowther (appellee)
would

take

action

against

her."

(5

9,

Defendant's

Answer;

Appendix, Appellee's Brief.)
In any event, the failure to record the Deed for some two and
one-half years is fatal to appellant's case.
Counsel for the plaintiff submitted an Affidavit in Support of
the Attorney's Fees pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-505, Utah
Code

of

Judicial

Administration,

U.R.Civ.P. (TR 78-0081.)
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and

pursuant

to

Rule

11,

This Court has held that attorney's fees can be awarded in
Taylor

connection with summary judgment decisions.
Taylor,

770 P.2d 163, (Utah App. 1989).

v.

Estate

of

The court discussed at

length the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and the award of attorney's fees in connection with
the summary judgment.
judgment

upon

Attorney's fees were awarded on summary

undisputed

material

facts

which

entitled

the

plaintiff to the award based upon the affidavit filed in accordance
with Utah statutes.
Judge

Orme pointed

out that

sanctions under Rule

11 are

imposed on an objective basis and not limited to the subjective
"bad faith" approach, and whether specific conduct amounts to a
violation of Rule 11 is a question of law.
Appellant has filed no affidavit of impecuniosity and should
be bound by reasonable inquiry as to the facts and law before
signing and filing the ill-founded and
filed herein.

irresponsible documents

By failing to conduct this inquiry, appellant has

violated Rule 11 and Rule 40(a), U.R.App.P.
caused

plaintiff

to

incur substantial

This neglect has

legal expense since the

trial.
Appellee respectfully

urges the Court to order sanctions,

including reasonable attorney's fees for the use and benefit of his
attorney pursuant to Rule 11, U.R.Civ.P. and Rule 40(a) U.R.App.P.
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The lack of reasonable inquiry on the part of appellant is apparent
from a cursory examination of the files and records in this case.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that appellee is entitled to an
order of this Court affirming the judgment of the trial court and
awarding reasonable attorney's fees to appellee.
Respectfully submitted,

VERL C. RITCHIE
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
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APPENDIX

Bryan D. Mower
Defendant
#5 Quietwood Ln.
Sandy, UT 84092
(801)572-1012
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DEAN W. CROWTHER
Plaintiff,
v.
BRYAN D. MOWER

Civil No. <?A/ / £ 3 - /

Defendant.
Defendant's answer to plaintiff allegations:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

2.

Defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and the

son of Nellie D. Crowther, Who died on August 9, 1991.
3.

Plaintiff was married to Nellie D. Crowther at the time of her death.

4.

On December 15,1988, Nellie D Cowther wrote a codicil to her last

will and testament. In the codicil, she stated her intentions to quick-claim deed
one-half interest in her real property. (Exhibit A) This property consisted of:
The West 1/2 of Lot #17 and East 1/2 of lot #18, Weberwild Estates, Plat "A11,
a subdivision as recorded in the Summit County Courthouse, Coalville,
Utah, together with all improvements thereon.
5.

Interest in the Weberwild property in Summit County was attained

by virtue of a quick-claim deed dated December 15,1988 and delivered to
Defendant via certified mail on December 16,1988.

6.

The quick-claim deed was delivered to defendant legally via

certified mail along with a letter from Utah Legal Services outlining Nellie
Crowther's intentions.
7.

Upon Nellie Crowther's death, the deed was recorded at the Summit

County Courthouse. It was Nellie Crowther's wishes and desire to give to her son
(Defendant) her undivided interest in the Summit County property. These wishes
were carried out when the deed was delivered to the Defendant.
Notwithstanding the fact, Bryan Mower is legally entitled to a one-half interest in
the said property.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
8.

Defendant incorporates herein all of the answers of paragraphs 1

through 7.
9.

Delivery of the deed was unconditional as indicated by the codicil.

(Exhibit A.) Mr Paul Warton, Attorney, Utah Legal Services, suggested the deed
be recorded subsequent to Mrs. Crowther's death in order to avoid ridicule and
fear Mr. Crowther would take action against her. Mr. Warton used precatory words
such as "suggest" and "should" which do not naturally import a legal obligation. Mr
Warton designated Mrs. Crowther's intention to "be sure her son received 1/2
interest in her property" by sending the quick-claim deed. This deed could have
legally been recorded at any time subsequent to delivery.
10.

Mr. Crowther's attorney's fees should not be paid by defendant due

to the fact this action was initiated totally by the plaintiff. In addition, no bad faith
was exhibited in that it was Mrs. Crowther who initiated the original transaction
while the defendant was living in the state of California.

WHEREFORE, Defendant demands judgment against plaintiff as follows:

1.

On his first Cause of Action for a judgment in favor of defendant and

against plaintiff decreeing that said deed was legally and lawfully given to
Defendant by his mother, Nellie D. Crowther, prior to her death via quick-claim
deed, and legally recorded her intentions in a codicil to her Last Will and
Testament.
2.

On the Second Cause of Action that attorney's fees be paid by

Defendant, it is asked that no fees be awarded due to the fact that Mrs. Crowther
initiated original transaction and Mr. Crowther filed the complaint. No bad faith on
the part of the defendant occurred.
DATED this

/J

/jda^ of Obteber, 1992

Bryan D.
Defendant's Address:
#5 Quietwood Ln.
Sandy, UT 84092

FIRST CODICIL TO THE
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
NELLIE D. CROWTHER
I, NELLIE D. CROWTHER, of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, being at least eighteen years of age, of sound mind and
memory, and acting under no restraint or duress of any kind, do
hereby make, publish and declare this instrument to be the FIRST
CODICIL to my Last Will and Testament executed on the 11th of
August, 1987, at Salt Lake County, Utah, and do hereby republish
said Will with the following change:
The second paragraph of tne section entitled "RESIDUARY
LEGATEES'1 is revised in its entirety to read as follows:
In the event that DEAN W. CROWTHER does not survive me,
I give all of the rest, residue and remainder of my property,
whether real, personal or mixed, and wherever situated, together
with any property over which I may have power of appointment to my
son and step-daughters, named above, as follows:

I have by

Quit-claim Deed, given to my son one-half of my home and other
real property; I hereby give the other half of each, if I have
received an interest by the probate of DEAN W. CROWTHER's estate
or otherwise, to my three step-daughters.

All of the rest of my

estate I give to the four children, share and share alike.

In the

event that one or more of my children predecease me, each deceased
child's share of my estate shall be equally divided amonf that
child's children.

1 of 3

EXECUTION OF INSTRUMENT
I, NELLIE D. CROWTHER, the Testatrix, sign my name to
__.

,,

day of

// ( u

t

r. f< Cv—-

, 1988,

and beir 7 first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned
authority that I sign and execute this instrument as the FIRST
CODICIL to my Last Will.
NELLIE D. CROWTHER

/9. /dJ^J

and

/? ^//^LS^
^z/. (/ 's^^^y^?^^^^^
/ t^e witnesses, sign our
names to this instrument, being first duly sworn, and do hereby
declare to the undersigned authority that the Testatrix signs and
executes this instrument as the FIRST CODICIL to her Last Will and
that she signs it willingly and that each of us, in the presence
and hearing of the Testatrix and of each other, hereby signs this
Codicil as witness to the Testatrix's signing, and that to the
best of our knowledge the Testatrix is eighteen years of age or
older, of sound mind, and under no constraint or undue influence-

In the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, on this .-r^ *\
day of
^>„ , ,. ^ y>^^r"
, 1988, before me, the undersigned
Notary, personally appeared NELLIE D. CROWTHER, the Testatrix,
[] who is personally known by me
ryiwho proved to me her identity through documentary evidence
^ i n 'the form of ^yy- Cvs ^ „v •.~ \ v
\ > ^ ^»S^x v^-s
,
to be the person whose name is signed on the preceding document,
who duly acknowledged to me that she has read and fully
understands it, executed the same voluntarily and for the purposes

set forth, and that she was acting under no constraint or undue
influence whatsoever.
Also personally appeared before me the witnesses
[] who is personally known by me
n w h o proved to me his/her identity through documentary evidence
'^in the form of
v y r ^ V L-^i:
^> ^ - ^
> \

and

£Z

c\> K(, ?•>

A

<-—

.->

^vS V C ^ N ^ c

Q/tfho i s p e r s o n a l l y known by me
who
proved to me his/her identity through documentary evidence
WIl
in the form of
to be the persons whose names are signed on the preceding
document, and who each^acknowledged to me that this document is
signed voluntarily for its stated purpose.
•

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

vsrv-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
^ ^
day of September, 1993,
two true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed to the
following, by placing the same in the United States Mail, postage
pre-paid, addressed as follows:
Bryan D. Mower
#5 Quietwood Ln.
Sandy Utah 84092

^^£L^

10

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

SEP 2 9 1993
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
•/•
r
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Clerk of the Court

I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of September, 1993, two
true and correct copies of the Brief of Appellee were served on the
appellant by placing the same in the United States Mail, postage
pre-paid, addressed as follows:
Bryan D. Mower
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